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The end of LEP and SLC is a good moment to review the way to summarize search results in order to exploit
at best, in future analyses and speculations, the pieces of information coming from all experiments. Some known
problems with the usual way of reporting results in terms “CL limits” are shortly recalled, and a plea is formulated
to publish just parametrized likelihoods, possibly rescaled to the asymptotic insensitivity limit level.
1. INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE
This contribution starts from an observation
which I hope is shared by many other particle
phycisists, and scientists in general. Science, and
particle physics in the specific case, should be
considered a global activity, with individuals co-
operating at different levels. Certainly, those who
have played relevant role in the research should be
acknowledged and, in special exceptional cases,
rewarded. But the outcome of the research should
be considered, finally, intellectual property of the
community which has allowed the research. This
point of view implies that a result should be pre-
sented in such a way that the pieces of informa-
tion provided by an experiment should be pos-
sibly exploited at best by other scientists. This
does not mean that I agree with populistic “do
it yourself analysis”, of which I have heard, as
only those who know in depth detector perfor-
mance and phenomenology can provide sensible
results. Therefore, the problem is only that of
making the result public in such a way that the
data summaries can be used later in the most ef-
ficient way.
As far as searches are concerned, the experi-
ment could report a spectacular effect which fits
easily in the rest of the knowledge (“the net of
beliefs”) and all members of the physics commu-
nity believe to a discovery. In other, not con-
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troversial cases, there could be no hint at all, as
it usually happens in most searches. But there
could be the case in which there are some indi-
cations. The scientists are then in the doubt of
making the claim, thus risking their reputation,
or keeping quite, thus loosing the chance. “The
experiment was inconclusive, and we had to use
statistics”, said one once. But statistical methods
are “inconclusive” by definition, if one interprets
them rigorously: even 100 observed events over
1 expected background does not necesseraly im-
plies that they are due to signal, though we all
tend to believe so. . . . Therefore, it is important
to distinguish between what we rationally believe
from what the empirical facts teach us.
Besides personal preference for prudence or to
risk, it is a matter of fact that the three situations
sketched above (discovery, no effect and dubious
hints) are not sharply separated. It is, therefore,
important to understand what is the “optimal
presentation”, following some desiderata which
can be summarised saying that the information
contained in the experimental data should be pre-
sented in the most powerful and unbiased way.
• The result should not depend on whether
one believes that there is no effect (i.e. giv-
ing a limit), or that something has been
found (a claim with an associated e.g. mass,
cross-section, etc).
• The pieces of evidence coming from differ-
ent experiments should be combined in the
2most efficient way:
– If many independent data sets each
provide a little evidence in favor of the
searched-for signal, the combination of
all data should enhance that hypothe-
sis.
– If the indications are incoherent, their
combination should provide a stronger
constraint against that hypothesis.
These desiderata are not satisfied by the usual
way of reporting results of searches with “CL lim-
its”. There are also other kinds of problems with
“CL limits”, some of which will be illustrated in
next section. In particular, there is a problem
of interpretation, which is the main cause of false
alarms in the past and of the spread of misleading
information to the general public (consequently
throwing bad shadows to the reputation of parti-
cle physicists).
2. PROBLEMS WITH LIMITS. EXAM-
PLES FROM THE CONTACT INTER-
ACTION SEARCHES
The first time I was confronted with the prob-
lems of stating limits was in occasion of an overall
analysis of results on electron compositeness.[1]
Analysing all results available at that time I found
the situation not really satisfactory. In many
cases the operative procedure used to evaluate
limits was not described, and sometimes the nu-
merical values of published limits seemed to dis-
agree with differential cross-section to which they
referred. I considered this problem particulary se-
rious because the procedure which I understood
had most consensus at that time had technical in-
trinsic problems in about 10% of the results, as it
will be explained in a while. But out of the many
douzens of results (many reactions × many cou-
pling ×many experiments), no technical anomaly
was reported.
Other bad feature was the difficulty (or impos-
sibility) to combine consistently the limits, with
the consequent attitude to quote only the larger
limit, that often was nothing but the largest sta-
tistical fluctuation, and not due to the experiment
having the higher resolution power for that chan-
nel.
2.1. Costraining Λ to infinity
In a contact interaction analysis, no effect is ob-
tained when the scale Λ is infinity. Therefore, one
looks in the data for a compatibility of the mea-
sured Λ with infinity, thus providing a lower limit.
Needless to say, a MINUIT minimization around
infinity is not trivial at all, not to speak about
the interpretation of results. As a consequence,
I found that, at that times, there was much of
kitchen to get a number to quote as lower limit
out of the MINUIT printout. The worst case was
an experiment which had got an upper limit of
1.3 TeV for a Λ in a certain coupling (this was
the number I got reanalysing their data, due to a
overfluctuation), but published exactly that num-
ber as lower limit.
This technical problem can be overcome work-
ing with the conjugate quantity ǫ = 1/Λ2, which
should come about zero in case of no effect.
The choice of the second power of Λ is due to
the observation that the new terms in the cross-
section come with that weigth. As a consequence,
any additive “noise” make ǫ Gaussian distributed
around the “true” value. Reporting the result
on ǫ is certainly a good empirical practice, also
because the results can be, in most cases, eas-
ily combined with the standard weighted average
formula. Moreover, the standard deviation of ǫ
is an intrinsic property of the experiment, a kind
of “resolution power” depending on quality of the
detector, luminosity, sensitivity to a particular re-
action and level of background. And, in fact, my
proposal[1] was to use simply σǫ as measure of
the resolution power of an individual experiment
or of a combination of experiments.
The problem remains if we insist to report a
CL limit. Calling ǫ◦ the best fit value, and σǫ
the standard deviation (the latter is related to
the curvature - “width” - of the χ2 parabola) the
standard 95% lower limit for Λ± is given by
Λ± =
1√
1.64σǫ ± ǫ◦
. (1)
This implies that, if |ǫ◦| is approximately equal
to 1.64σǫ, then either limit becomes very large.
3If |ǫ◦| > 1.64 σǫ (10% of cases) there are prob-
lems with the standard procedure, including the
fact that for either sign of coupling there should
be an evidence, yielding an upper limit for Λ. As
a matter of fact, unwanted results are tamed us-
ing “prescriptions”, including “Bayesian prescrip-
tions” – a contradiction in terms, in my view.
Besides the details of procedures, it is clear that
this kind of approach can produce large limits
just as statistical fluctuations, limits which have
nothing to do with the effective resolution power
of the experiment for a particular channel. It is
also a matter of fact that the difficulty to combine
limits obtained in such a way resulted in a general
tendency to believe that a larger limit would make
the lower ones obsolete, though the latter might
result from higher resolution experiments.
3. MISINTERPRETATION OF “C.L.
RESULTS”
A second problem with standard “C.L.” is their
interpretation, as it resulted from a survey I made
in 1998 [2]. It came out, in fact, that most particle
physicists believed that, e.g., a 95% C.L. lower
bound on the Higgs mass meant that “the mass of
the Higgs, provided it existed, has 95% chance to
be above the limit, and 5% chance to be below”.
So, the problem is: do we understand each other?
Do we communicate the correct information to
the general public of tax payer which financed
our research?
Nowadays it is quite understood by many peo-
ple that such probabilistic statements are erro-
neous and misleading, but there are still people
which use such wrong statements based on fre-
quentistic C.L.’s to report the results to the gen-
eral public.[3] So, for example, the 2000 hint of a
115 GeV Higgs was reported by a spokesperson
of the LEP experiments saying that “It is a 2.6
sigma effect. So there’s still a 6 in 1000 chance
that what we are seeing are background events,
rather than the Higgs”[4]. So, basically the prob-
lem persists, since also those who agree on what
CL’s should not mean, but still stick on the fre-
quentistic approach, have difficulty in explaining
what those results do mean. In my opinion, the
very reason of this matter of fact is that, from a
genuine inferential point of view – which is what
matters in Science [5] – frequentistic CL’s have
no meaning,2 and only in some case, under some
hidden hypotheses, they can be related to sensi-
ble probabilistic statements. This is the reason
why I insist in my position that “the solution to
the problem of confidence limits begins with re-
moving the expression itself”.[7]
4. BAYESIAN WAY OUT
In my opinion, the solution is not to propose
a new prescription with the hope that it will be
adopted by some influential friends, but rather
to change radically the attitude. This means
we should review critically how our beliefs about
physics quantities or laws of nature are modified
by empirical observation and, once we have un-
derstood this scheme, we should stick to it, using
logic instead of tradition and/or authority. The
most powerful tool to learn from data is – and
this is not merely my opinion – a theorem, which
states how our beliefs must be updated by new
pieces of information. This is the undiscussed role
of Bayes’ theorem, on which there is agreement
also by those who disagree on the use of beliefs
in physics (but this is a different story, on which
there is little to discuss, since Science is nothing
but a collection of beliefs based on empirical facts
and intellectual constructions. . . ).
Referring to a physics quantity of unknown
value µ, the Bayes’ theorem can be shortly ex-
pressed as
f(µ | data, I) ∝ f(data |µ, I)× f◦(µ | I) , (2)
where the three ingredients of the Bayesian infer-
ence are, from left to right, final pdf, likelihood
and prior. Note that f() stands, in this approach,
for the the pdf expressing the relative beliefs.
It is self-evident that the likelihood has the role
of re-shaping (re-weighting) the beliefs. This is a
fundamental ingredient of inference, but not the
2Here is the most recent example I know of the series of
misleading press releases in which frequentistic numbers
(i.e. without a precise inferential meaning) are translated
into probabilistic statements: “The experimenters re-
ported a three-sigma discrepancy in sin2qW, which trans-
lates to a 99.75 percent probability that the neutrinos are
not behaving like other particles.”[6]
4only one. Usually it is considered “more objec-
tive” than priors, because it is easier to agree on
the response of a detector than on purely spec-
ulative values of µ. Nevertheless, f(data |µ, I) is
a probability too, and, as such, tells how much
we believe that some data could be observed, for
every hypothesis on µ.
At this point, the usual objection is that “there
are the priors”. In my opinion, there is no real
problem if we understand on the logically cru-
cial, often practically irrelevant role of priors.
Without them, it would be impossible to make
the “probabilistic inversion” from f(data |µ, I) to
f(µ | data,I), which is the essence of the prob-
abilistic inference. As far as its practical role,
it depends on the different problems, and, more
specifically, on the shape of the likelihood. This
is the reason why I like to classify the inferential
problems into closed and open likelihood.
4.1. Closed likelihood
The easy case is when, for a given set of data,
the likelihood function, L(µ) = f(data |µ, I) is
closed in both sides, i.e. L(µ) → 0 when µ tends
to the extremes of its physical region of definition
(usually −∞ < µ < +∞ or 0 < µ < +∞). The
best understood example of this case is a Gaus-
sian response of the apparatus. Under this condi-
tion and, in particular, when the width of L(µ) is
narrow with respect to any rational prior knowl-
edge (the so Savage’s “precise experiment” situ-
ation), the conclusions do not depend practically
(in the sense how the result is perceived) from any
reasonable model of the prior. Obviously, there
could be someone who has a pure mathemati-
cal approach to the problem and propose a fancy
mathematical expression for the prior. But I do
not think this is a problem for physicists (and,
anyhow, I am very curious to meet a defender of
such fancy prior to check how ready he/she is to
defend it with a suitable combination of bets. . . ).
4.2. Open likelihood
The question becomes really problematic when
the likelihood is open in either side, i.e. L(µ) goes
to a constant at the edges of the physical region (if
it is open in both sides the experiment has little
relevance, unless it helps in enhancing a certain
region selected by other experiment having closed
likelihood). For example, in the Higgs search of
the kind performed at LEP, an infinite mass pro-
duces a non zero pdf of observing what we do ob-
serve. This “bad” feature is due to background:
whatever we observe, we are never certain that
it is not due to background alone. If this is the
case, we are never able to normalize the final pdf,
unless we force the normalization with a prior (or
other empirical evidence, like radiative correction
in the specific problem of the Higgs [8], which for-
bids (or strongly inhibits) high masses. It follows
that the sensitivity to the prior is usually so crit-
ical (for an extensive, introductory discussion of
problem and proposed solution, see Ref. [9]) that
one should refrain from publishing, and spread to
the general public, probabilistic limits, or limit
which are usually mis-interpreted as such (this is
what happens practically always with CL’s lim-
its).
In the case of open likelihood, only the likeli-
hood itself should be reported. This information
can be easily combined with that coming from
other experiments, and satisfies the desiderata of
Section 1. Alternatively, one could report the log-
likelihood or the rescaled R function proposed in
Refs. [9,8]. This functions can be parametrized
in a suitable way, and perhaps stored in web sites
in the case of searches having the likelihood de-
pending of several quantities. An example of pub-
lished parametrized log-likelihood can be found in
Ref. [10].
An alternative to probabilistic, or CL bounds,
to quantify with a single number (or with contour
lines in the case of multidimensional analysis) is
to report the sensitivity bound. This quantity
should give, though roughly, the edge after which
the experiment looses sensitivity to the search
[9,7].
5. CONCLUSION: A PLEA FROM A EU
TAX PAYER
In conclusion, my plea to LEP and SLC col-
leagues, as well as to all other physicists involved
in searches, is to report likelihoods for all searched
channel, so that the effort of all community can
be used at best for all future analyses.
5I would like to remember that publishing like-
lihoods was, actually, a point about which there
was unanimous agreement in the January 2000
workshop on confidence limits held at CERN, as
explicitly asked by Massimo Corradi and recorded
by Louis Lyons [11]. It was, indeed, the only gen-
erally agreed conclusion of the workshop. 3
On the light of the well known properties of
the likelihood and on the agreement during that
meeting, attended by representative by all ma-
jor experiments, it is surprising to realize that
reporting likelihoods has not become the stan-
dard yet. Some say that I am too na¨ıve, and that
this will never happen, essentially for two reasons.
First, publishing a likelihood is much more com-
mitting than just giving a single “95% CL limit”
in the region where other experiments report sim-
ilar limits. Second, there are people specialized in
combination of results which do use likelihoods,
but are afraid to loose this privileged position if
likelihoods are available to any student. I hope it
is not so, and that it is only due to some inertia.
Therefore I am still optimistic (or na¨ıve).
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